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Abstract 
Rhetorics and promises by politicians in the campaign trail are o.fien not delivered to the 
people as a result of their interest in carting away puhlic funds for. thereby rendering 
their followers pauperized. Good governance is ensured in a corruption-free 
environment. This paper appraises the on-going campaign against corruption in Nigeria. 
especially during the Fourth Republic. The paper. argues that corruption is one of the 
worst problems, hindering Nigeria's progress in socio-economic growth and 
development. Some non-governmental Otganizations and civil society/liberty associations 
have been promoting anticorruption crusades but there is needfor wider publicity on the 
cancerous monster ravaging the nation. The fight against corruption in Nigeria requires 
thorough access to useful information for the masses. The paper pointed out that curbing 
corruption has to do with full awareness of its devastating efi'ects and how the political 
elites as well as leaders in power are playing with peoples' well being. In the light of this, 
the paper recommends a national rebirth/reorientation on anticorruption in Nigeria. 
Enthroning a value system tlzat rejects corruption in all levels o.fsociety will add to the 
fight against corruption. In addition. government should empower the masses through 
provision of infrastructure and amenities needed for elltrepreneurial skills/vocational 
acquisition to flourish and thereby reduce the extent ofpoverty in the country. 
Keywords: Corruption; Anti-corruption Crusade; Fourth Republic, Non-Governmental 
Organization, Political Elite. 
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group 
unjust 
benefits 
which confers 
or fraudulent 
on its 
perpetrators, IS 
inconsistent with the 
. established legal norms 
and prevailing moral 
ethos of the land and is 
likely to subvert or 
diminish the capacity of 
the legitimate authorities 
to provide fully for the 
material and spiritual 
well being of all manners 
of society m a just and 
equitable manner 
(2002:23). 
Corruption from this perspective is seen 
as "outright theft, embezzlement of funds 
or other misappropnat1on of state 
property, nepotism and the granting of 
favour to personal acquaintances and the 
abuse of the public authority to exact 
payments and privileges" 
(Desta,2006: 19). Viewed from this angle, 
the general public is seen as the principal 
victim and the public officials as the 
agent. 
According to Dike (2003) 
corruption in Nigeria occurs in so many 
different (orms. Political corruption which 
takes place at the highest levels of 
political authority, affects the manner in 
which decisions are made. Electoral 
corruption is the buying of votes, special 
favours to anointed candidates or 
promises of illegitimate votes to certain 
candidates. Another type is bureaucratic 
corruption which takes place among 
public servants. This type of corruption is 
what the citizen's expenence m 
mm1stries, departments and agencies 
(MDAs) including schools, hospitals and 
police stations (Ovienloba 2007). For 
Olarinmoye (2008) electoral corruption 
finds an intimate link between electoral 
process and poor governance. When 
electoral process are subverted, it leads to 
the installation of individuals who pursue 
their private interest rather than the 
general interest hence this will eventually 
lead to bad governance, poverty and 
economic underdevelopment that have 
plagued Nigeria (Olarinmoye 2008). One 
aspect of corruption that has contributed 
to Nigeria's underdevelopment is 
beaurecratic corruption which does not 
allow for effective management of 
resources by the government that could 
improve the well being of the citizens 
making it an obstacle to good governance 
in Nigeria (Lawai and Tobi 2006). Agba 
(20 I 0) has examined the different types 
·of corruption and concluded that 
bureaucratic and political corruption 
weaken good governance. This is so 
because policy makers become hesitant in 
taking decisions to reduce corruption or 
introduce new reforms to combat it. 
Corruption has remained one of 
the most complex problems that have 
impeded development in Nigeria. 
Corruption is one of the issues ravaging 
the foundation of the nation. Ribadu 
(2006) also stated that corruption is one of 
the most dangerous social ills of any 
society because corruption, like a deadly 
virus, attacks the vital structure that 
makes society to progress, thus putting its 
very existence into serious perils 
Preventing corruption in Nigeria has been 
very difficult, based on the dimension it 
has taken particularly lack of political 
leadership. A situation where looters of 
nation's wealth go without charge, 
awarded contracts that were never 
executed and yet given recognition in the 
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Therefore, preventing abuse and reducing 
corruption is important to increase for 
social and economic wellbeing of the 
society. 
Despite the enormous income from 
oil in the last four decades, 54.4% of 
Nigerians are still poor (NBS, 2008). 
Many sources have reported that the 
percentage of the population living below 
or at purchasing power parity of $1.25 a 
day is 64.4% (UNDP African Human 
Development Report, 20 12). Access to 
quality and affordable health services and 
other basic amenities including safe 
drinking water and improved sanitation 
facilities is limited and economic 
opportunities remain poor for many 
citizens. With children under 15 years of 
age accounting for about 45 percent of the 
country's population (FGN 2004), the 
burden of health sector has become 
overwhelming. 
Comparatively, there has been an 
increase in the budget over the last two-
decades 1990 - 2010 accounting for 
N362, 19.60 and N2,961 850.00 (CBN, 
201 0). The challenges facing poor 
masses, in spite of this increased budget, 
have remained enormous. The output in 
terms of service provision at all the three 
tiers of government has been very 
clj~~ouragyngK The gladiators constantly 
manipulated the people and the political 
processes to advance their own selfish 
agenda, while the society remained 
pauperized and the masses in a 
supposedly blessed country wallowed in 
abject poverty 
This is a threat to growth and 
development for the country. According 
to African Human Development Report 
(20 12), Nigeria has been found to be 
among the very few countries that have 
the highest percentage (27%) of 
\ \ 
corruption v1ctm1s who faced a bribe 
situation in 2008. It impacts negatively on 
individual or group behaviour leading to 
vices such as bribery, nepotism, and 
misappropriation of funds which have 
become the order of the day. According to 
lke (2009), cormption is probably the 
fastest means to accumulate quick wealth 
in Nigeria. Hence, it has placed a great 
need for a critical appraisal of corrupt 
practices in relation to sociological issues 
of society pressures during the fourth 
republic. 
Measures of combating this 
malaise of corruption and the challenges 
it poses, requires an understanding of its 
causes. Many factors contribute to the 
spread of corruption in Nigeria. For 
instance Dininio and Kpundeh (1999), 
Dike (2003), and Obayelu (2007), has 
traced the root causes of corruption in 
Nigeria to; poor payment system in the 
country, tepid attitudes of officials who 
are charged with enforcing the laws lead 
to cormpt behaviours. Obayelu (2007) has 
specifically identified a number of factors 
propagating cormpt practices in Nigeria. 
They include lack of clear rules and code 
of ethics that leads to the abuse of 
political power; hence most Nigerians are 
exposed to corrupt practices. Furthermore 
low salaries and unfavourable working 
conditions with poor incentives for 
effective performance are strong 
indicators for cormption (Obayelu, 2007). 
Due to the fact that workers in Nigeria 
both in the private and public sectors are 
poorly paid and sometimes they are not 
paid regularly, it gives an opportunity for 
corrupt practices especially bureaucratic 
corruption. This is because when workers 
are not paid they will devise alternatives 
means to meet their family obligations 
..,...,.. 
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state apparatus is used to build up the 
layer of the primordial public, thus 
making corruption the hallmark of the 
civic public (Osaghae 1988). 
A good citizen of the primordial 
public is one who gives out and asks for 
nothing in return and will only continue to 
be a good man if he channels part of the 
largesse from the civic public to the 
primordial public. That is the logic of the 
dialectics which makes it legitimate to rob 
the civic public in order to strengthen the 
primordial public. The acme of this 
dialectics is corruption which takes two 
dimensions - the embezzlement of public 
fund from the civic public and the 
solicitation and acceptance of bribes from 
individuals seeking services provided by 
the civic public by those who administer 
these services (Ekeh 1975). 
Richard Joseph in another study 
linked corruption to the fall of the 
Nigerian Second Republic (Joseph). This 
as a result of prebendalism in which state 
offices are regarded as prebends that can 
be appropriated by office holders, who 
use them to generate material benefits for 
themselves and their constituents and kin 
groups. For Seteolu (2005) whi le 
clientelism and prebendalism might be 
mutually reinforcing, the two concepts 
have separate meanings. C lientelism 
defines the nature of individual and group 
relationships within the broader social and 
political space, prebendalism are 
essentially a function of the competition 
for, and appropriation of the offices of the 
state. According to Seteolu (2005) 
cl ientelism assists to understand the 
mechanism of (how) class control 
legitimizes the lopsided distribution of 
resources among social groups and 
enhances the status of the political elite. 
The soft state thesis propounded by Gurnl 
Myrdal also helps us to understand why 
corruption persists in a country like 
Nigeria. This theory gives us a better 
understanding of a post-colonial state and 
its predicament largely drawn from the 
Asian experience but applicable to the 
rest of thi rd world including Nigeria. A 
soft state whether democratic or 
undemocratic is bedeviled with the 
inability to institute reforms or enforce 
social discipline. It is a state where the 
legal system and its paraphernalia are 
moribund or at least ineffective. Even 
when framing policies, the authorities 
(under the control of politico-bureaucratic 
elite) are reluctant to place obligations on 
the people, especially in matters of 
corruption (Myrdal 1968). Gulthorpe 
( 1975) further explains that a soft state is 
. one in which formal rules (laws, officially 
stated administrative rules and practices, 
etc) are applied copiously and in a lax 
manner rather than vigorously and 
consistently. It is a state in which private 
advantage can be gained and private 
bargains struck concerning the 
enforcement or non enforcement of the 
rules, as when a businessman bribes a tax 
official. Apart from money inducement, 
corruption is generated through kinship 
sentiment and nepotism Therefore, one of 
the damaging consequences of the politics 
of identity is that it tends to render the 
state soft. Laws are discriminately applied 
and the anti-.corruption laws are not an 
exception. Therefore, one of the 
characters of a soft state is its over-
permissiveness of corruption and corrupt 
acts. This explains the non-workability of 
government anti-corruption agencies 
instituted by the Obasanjo administration 
such as the Economic and Financial 
Crime Commission (EFCC), the 
.... 
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colonials. However, the group became 
increasingly prosperous and more of a 
bourgeoisie after the colonialists were 
dislodged from power in the former 
colonial states, including Nigeria. 
The bourgeois class in Nigeria was a 
loose coalition of the elites of the 
disparate ethnic and religious groups and 
economic interests. In the struggle against 
the colonial regime, this class united 
under common grievances even though it 
was fragmented along the fault lines of 
Nigeria's incoherent economy and its 
multi-ethnic and religious makeup. 
The self-rule struggle spearheaded 
by this class against colonial system was 
not motivated altruistically to change or 
reform the system to function in the 
interest of the masses but merely to 
inherit the system for their selfish 
interests. This objective became obvious 
and manifest for most of the decades after 
independence as exemplified in the 
oppressive character of the post-colonial 
state which made it anti-democratic for 
most of the post-independent period. 
Even under the so-called democratic 
dispensation that followed the third wave 
of global democratic phenomenon, the 
transition for this dominant ruling class in 
Nigeria to be driven by the interests of the 
collectives in their actions and policies is 
yet to occur. 
Though democratic in name, the 
nature of post-1999 democracy in Nigeria 
has continued to manifest anti-democratic 
tendencies which we shall be discuss ing 
in detai Is in the next section. The reason 
for these goes back to the structure of 
economy and politics instituted and 
nurtured by colonialism. According to 
Ake (2002), the logic of colonialism did 
not allow the Nigerian political class to be 
anything more than marginal 
economically. Because of this weakness, 
the only instrument available for this class 
to ascend to power was politics and mass 
mobi I ization. With the acquisition of 
political power, this class used the state to 
expand their economic base. This was 
done through expansion of the state soon 
after independence using the ideology of 
economic development that supports the 
state direct participation in the economy 
through the establishment of state- owned 
industries and state run enterprises, thus 
expanding the role of the state in the lives 
of the people (Ake 1996). 
This, of course, has shaped the 
dynamics of politics in Nigeria and made 
it a zero-sum game in the sense that 
advancement m econom1cs 1s 
synonymous with advancement m 
politics. The implication of this is the 
·high value placed on political power in 
Nigeria which has created an obsessive 
preoccupation with politics since that is 
the only avenue for economic 
accumulation. Access to political power 
implies that the lucky elements would be 
in charge of the numerous government 
owned industries and enterprises of which 
they can lay their hands into the till 
without being accountable to the general 
public. 
Ake ( 1996) argues that this 
tendency of the Nigerian system 
undermines the society. The use of 
political power for accumulation of 
wealth makes Nigerian capitalism 
unproductive. This is because the 
wealthiest people in Nigeria are generally 
people who have acquired wealth through 
state power either by political corruption, 
access to state contracts, agency rates or 
concessions such as import licenses that 
hardly involve them in direct productive 
activity. 
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from the struggle within the Nigerian ruling 
elites that such tightening of hold would 
guarantee survival for the dominant f~1ction 
of the ruling class controlling the centre. 
For instance, the civil war was as a result of 
the rivalry and fear of domination between 
the country's major ethnic groups. The 
coup led by Kaduna Nzeogwu was 
interpreted by the North as a ploy by the 
lgbo to dominate the country given the fact 
that prominent northern politicians and 
military officers lost their lives in the 
process. The counter coup of July 1966 led 
by northern officers, spurred chains of 
events including the mass killing of the 
Igbo and easterners residing in the north 
and the declaration of Biafr·an republic 
(Ojeifa 2004). 
The war that followed was an 
attempt by the Northern dominated federal 
government to reunite the east with the rest 
of the country. To co-opt the minorities of 
the Niger Delta where oil economy is 
bourgeoning to the federal side, the Gowon 
military administration created states for 
them, thus satisfying a long dream that had 
its root in the colonial era but 
systematically removed the control of the 
oil from them under the guise that enough 
resources is needed at the federal level to 
prosecute the war. In other words, it is the 
effective manipulation and abuse of the 
structure and processes of state power to 
accumulate oil surplus and institutionalize 
factional rule that . brought monopolistic 
tendencies that are attended by 
authoritarianism, corruption and 
patrimonialism which of course breeds 
instability and politics of exclusion (Obi , 
2002). ., 
The texture of this argument is to 
drive the point that the federal dominance 
has proven unfair, exploitative and 
subversive of the spirit of federalism which 
Nigeria professes, bringing about a 
s ituation where political power 1s 
concentrated in a tier of government that 
also controls the collection and distribution 
of all oil resources making other tiers 
dependent and marginalized from oil 
power. The conflict in the Niger Delta is 
therefore an attempt to redress this 
character of the Nigerian state which goes 
back to the colonial era that foisted a 
political-economic structure sustained for 
the benefit of the profiteering alliance of 
ruling elites and the oil majors (Adebanwi 
2001 ). The transition of the country from 
colonialism to a post-colonial state was a 
mere symbolism of flag independence as it 
has remained an unfini shed project in terms 
of real power metrics, which became 
glaring in the foreign control of oil since 
the inception of the Nigerian petroleum 
industry and the dominance of Nigeria's 
political economy (Obi, 2002). 
The global economic crisis of the 
1980s was very significant in creating the 
condition for the new form of ethno-
nationalism that arose in the 1990s in 
Nigeria. The resultant decline in oil revenue 
and mismanagement of resources by 
unaccountable military elites plunged the 
country into an economic crisis that left its 
trail of social consequences that partly 
contributed to this new form of ethno-
nationalism manifesting in Nigeria (Duruji, 
201 0). The severity of the crisis compelled 
the government to implement an economic 
refonn program premised on stabilization 
and adjustment, which was supervised by 
the World Bank and the International 
Monetary Fund. This reform consisted of 
liberalization, privatization, deregulation, 
and the removal of subsidies, all of which 
were ideas aimed at scaling down · the 
state's role in the economy. The effects of 
these policies were reflected in the collapse 
of local industries and decline in the 
capacity of the ones that survived including 
rising costs of business in vital energy and 
power sectors. The consequent shrinking of 
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The Sociology of Corruplion in Nigeria 
The sociological dimension of corruption 
in Nigeria is deeply rooted in Nigeria's 
political economy and the character of 
Nigeria state. It is a fact that N igcria was 
a creation of colonialism to serve purely 
British economic interest without regard 
for · the natives. The struggle for 
independence, initially premised on the 
plank of correcting the exploitation of 
Nigeria's resources by foreign interests 
became fractionalized along ethnic and 
other fault lines dividing the country. 
Consequently instead of a pan Nigerian 
struggle for independence, it became an 
ethno-regional struggle to replace the 
colonialists. The implication of this is that 
the faction of elites that acquires power 
comes in and pursues ethno-regional 
agenda that negates pan-Nigerian 
interests. Secondly, the rentier nature of 
the Nigeria state and the near zero 
industrial productivity base, make access 
to power in Nigeria vital as that is the 
most important means of accumulation. 
To retain power and the access to wealth, 
the power elite must dispense favour to 
retinues of supporters. 
Given this scenario, corrupt 
practices in Nigeria had involved myriads 
of political elites/leaders in various levels 
of political offices who engage in corrupt 
adivities to enrich themselves and their 
circle of friends and suppmiers. This is 
done through gross misappropriation of 
budgets meant for development purposes 
to benefit the general interests. this kind 
of corruption is what Ribadu (2006) says 
involves deliberate use of one's position 
to get illegitimate benefits and undue 
advantage which could be financial or in 
other forms.. Most of the time, this 
corrupt leaders embezzle the country's 
treasury with reckless abandon. This 
looting of public funds are sometimes due 
largely to social pressures from relatives 
and kinsmen who believe that access to 
power by their close kin is an open 
invitation to squander the nation wealth 
while the tenure last. In the process, these 
leaders acquires outrageous amount they 
and their coming generation does not 
need. For instance, the former Head of 
State General. Sani Abacha siphoned $2.3 
billion from the government treasury, 
a warded contracts worth $1 billion to his 
personal companies, and took $1 billion 
as bribe fi·om foreign contractors (Edikan 
and Emem 2008) Likewise Professor 
Adenike Grange, a former Minister of 
Health (2007-2008) along with others, 
was arraigned in an Abuja court over 
financial impropriety involving the sum 
of 5.2 billion naira ($34,666,666.67 US 
Dollars) (The Nation, 2009). 
The prevailing attitude among 
Nigerians, sometimes make these corrupt 
practices inevitable. The Nigerian socio-
economic landscape creates an 
environment that is uneonducive for the 
upright and men of integrity to thrive. For 
instance ones a person assumes a public 
office, he discovers that his/her circle of 
friends has multiplied. Congratulatory 
messages from sundry quarters appear all 
in a bid to position themselves for 
patronages. Invitation for launchings and 
social events where the public official 
was hitherto a non-entity, now abound 
most of them identifying him as the most 
important personality for the occasion 
with expectation for him/her to dole at 
financial largesse, notwithstanding the 
source of such monies. This consequently 
renders ineffective, anticorruption 
measures adopted by the government 
sometimes under pressure from civil 
society groups and external interests. As 
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started out with serving former Head of 
State, the late Sani Abacha. When i\bacha 
died he shifted his allegiance to former 
Vice-President Atiku Abubakar and then 
to President Olusegun Obasanjo, and 
played a major role in pushing the 
infamous third-term agenda, whi le he was 
governor of Delta Stale. Alter he finished 
his two-terms and lost his immunity from 
prosecution as prescribed by the 
Constitution, Ibori found another cover by 
installing his relative, Emmanuel 
Uduaghan, as governor of Delta State as 
well as aligning himself with the late 
President Umam Yar"Adua, whose 
campaign he allegedly bankrolled. 
As the tenure wore on, there were 
indications that Ibori was gearing up to 
become vice-president to Yar' Adua in his 
second term in office, to replace President 
Goodluck Jonathan, who was vice- . 
president then. However, the death of 
Yar' Adua, before the end of his first 
tenure changed the political calculations, 
with Jonathan taking over at the helm of 
affairs. That singular change in 
government, many believe, resulted in the 
Economic and Financial Crime 
Commission (EFCC) re-opening Ibori's 
case in 2010, forcing him to flee to Dubai, 
United Arab Emirates, where he was 
eventually arrested and extradited to the 
"' UK (Agba 2012). 
The first attempt by the EFCC to 
prosecute lbori in 2007, whi le Yar' Adua 
was president, was unsuccessful and 
shortly after the then Chairman of EFCC, 
Mallam Nuhu Ribadu, was not only 
removed from office, he was demoted and 
dismissed from the police. Ibori 's 
corruption case was transferred to the 
Asaba High Court and a new judge 
appointed in the person of Marcel 
Awokulehin to handle the case, dismissed 
all 170 counts against him without 
hearing any evidence at trial. But when 
there was change in government, Ibori 
preferred to be tried in the UK rather than 
in Nigeria, where he had earlier been 
declared not guilty (Ajaero 2012). 
EFCC operators had pledged in a 
newspaper report to further prosecute 
lbori when he returns to Nigeria, The 
sentencing of Ibori was based on the 
foundation of the case built by the EFCC 
in 2007 which unfortunately was thrown 
out by the Federal High Court in Asaba 
for lack of merit. The same fate has lately 
befallen other EFCC cases, notably the 
Erastus Akingbola, Ndudi Elumelu, 
Dimeji Bankole and Gbenga Daniel 
matters. They were all thrown out by the 
courts purely on technical grounds 
without consideration of the substantive 
issues (Chidozie 2012). The Commission 
stated that "The fact that a case which 
supposedly lacked merit in Nigeria could 
fetch a 13-year jail term in the UK after a 
landmark guilt plea, brings to the fore the 
need for a reassessment of the nation's 
justice delivery process . . We must 
strengthen our judicial institutions if we 
are to make any headway in the anti-graft 
efforts." However, it is worthy of note 
that since inception, the EFCC has 
arraigned about 19 former governors on 
corruption charges, but none of them is 
currently serving prison term in Nigeria 
(Chidozie 20 12). 
But beside the ineffectiveness of 
EFCC and other anti-corruption agencies 
to effectively prosecute corruption cases 
and obtain conviction, is the attitude of 
Nigerians who quickly coalesce to protect 
these corrupt elements, a bully ruling 
class. The cases of lbori, Alamesegha and 
Bode George indicate the same trend. 
When Alamesegha had issues of money 
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National Assembly since it was 
inaugurated in 1999 (Fa lade 20 II). The 
first scandal over furniture allowance and 
award of bogus contracts Jed to the bll of 
Senator Chuba Okadigbo during the first 
tern of Obasanjo. Senator llaruna 
Abubakar who was the deputy Senate 
President in 2000 was accused or 
embezzling of 16.9 million natra 
($140,833) of Christmas and Sallah gifts. 
Senator Adolphus Wabara who became 
the Senate president after the 2003 
General election was also forced to resign 
after accusation were leveled against him 
for demanding gratification from 
ministries and agencies to uphold their 
budget proposals. The next principal 
officer of the National Assembly that was 
forced to step down on accusation of 
corruption related to inflation of contract 
terms was the first woman to become the 
speaker of House of Representatives, Mrs 
Patricia Eteh. The former speaker of the 
House of Representatives, in 2007 lost her 
seat due to award of contracts at inOated 
price of 628 million naira ($ 233,333) in 
2007 (Fa lade 2011 ), but was later 
exonerated by her colleagues. 
The man that took over from 
Representative Patricia Eteh, 
Representative Dimeji Bankole was not 
free of this corruption bug in the National 
· Assen1bly as he was in constant battles 
with a segment of the House that accused 
him of corrupt practices and also sent 
deluge of petitions that EFCC found 
credible and used against him. Dimeji 
Bankole was alleged to have over 
invoiced the bill for the purchase of 
vehicles for oversight functions at the ra~e 
of 2.4 billion naira.(A iabi and 
Fashagba,201 0). 
Even though he completed his 
tenure with the 6th Assembly, Bankole 's 
people rejected him at the polls during the 
20 I I General Elections and the EFCC 
arrested him and charged him to court for 
taking loans on behalf of the House of 
Representative that was not appropriated 
and awarding contracts for sundry items. 
The question that arises from the 
examples highlighted above, boils down 
to motives behind these corrupt 
tendencies. Certainly, sociological factors 
has been shown to exert pressure even 
upon the unwilling who eventually 
succumb to temptations of corruption so 
as to remain relevant and retain such 
highly exulted office. Professor Fabian 
Osuj i an academician who was the former 
education minister between 2003-2005 
was stunned at what he met at the 
National Assembly when he went to 
defend his education budget. He was 
asked by members of the education 
committee in collaboration with some 
principal omcers including Former 
president of the Senate, Senator Adolphus 
Wabara to grease their hand before his 
ministries budget can be passed. As a 
neophyte he went back to his ministry and 
its parastatals to mobilize 55 million naira 
($458333) bribe money he offered 
Senator Adolphus Wabara and the House 
Committees on Education m 2005 
(Falade, 201 I. Lewis, 2011). This 
tendency of making demands was also 
exposed with the imbroglio between the 
House of Representatives and Chairman 
of Security Exchange Commission Miss 
Arunma Oteh. 
The enormous pressure office 
holders face everyday once they ascend 
power, compels them to soil their hands 
just to maintain and oil their machine to 
retain power. Nigerian generally raise 
expectation of trickle down from office 
holders and given the number of people 
Dumji, M. Ill. & A:ull, D.£. (2013), The Politic.\ lfllli Sociology ofCormpliou in kigeriuDK~ Fourtllllepublic, 83 
ANSU Jounwl of l'eucc: uml De1·elopmeu1 Swdie.,, 1(2):65-86 
democracy cannot be achic\ ed without a 
confrontation of this bchcnJOih or 
corruption in Nigeria. 
However, the fact is that 
corruption has been long recognized both 
by the government, civil society and the 
populace as a hindrance to development 
in the country. All attempts to tackle 
corruption in Nigeria seem to be hitting 
the brick wall. The reason for this is not 
far fetched, it revolves around the values 
system in the country which seems to 
have made corruption the normal way or 
life in Nigeria. 
The sense of entitlement in the 
country and the fratricidal division of the 
people along multiple fault lines tends to 
encourage corruption and give it fillip to 
endure. The character of Nigeria's 
political economy as well as massive 
poverty of the populace bas kept 
reinforcing the fabrics that support 
corTuption in Nigeria. 
In the light of this, this paper 
recommends that the only way corruption 
can be tackled in the country is not only 
strengthening of the laws and the 
institutions that enforce them, but much 
more than that, a national rebirth that 
targets at reorientation of the entire 
Nigerian populace is imperative. This 
should be aimed at instituting a val ue 
·-- system that rejects corruption and should 
have zero tolerance for such practices. To 
this regard designing an academic 
curriculum that incorporates corruption 
and its negative vices in school curricula 
should be part of the educational system 
from the basic level to the tertiary. In 
addition, government should empower the 
masses through provision of infrastructure 
and amenities needed for entrepreneurial 
skills to flourish and thereby reduces the 
extent of poverty in the country. 
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